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Abstract
Accounting for the uncertainty inherent in real-time perceptions of the state of the
economy is believed to be critical for the analysis of historical monetary policy. We
investigate this claim through the lens of a small-scale new-Keynesian model with
optimal discretionary policy and partial information about the state. The model is
estimated using maximum likelihood on US data over the Volcker-Greenspan-Bernanke
regime. A comparison of our estimates to those from a version of the model with
complete information reveals that under partial information: (i) the Federal Reserve
demonstrates a signicant concern for stabilizing uctuations in the output gap, and
(ii) the discrepancy between optimal and observed policy behavior is smaller.
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1 Introduction
Central banks face the dicult task of conducting monetary policy in situations where real-
time uncertainty about the state of the economy is pervasive. Uncertainty of this kind has
two sources. One is the \noise" contained in preliminary measures of economic activity, such
as output and ination, that are used by policymakers to forecast the state. Data on these
variables are continually revised over time, so the true values are not known until long after
they are rst released and policy decisions have been made (e.g., Croushore and Stark, 2001).
A second source of uncertainty concerns estimates of economic concepts that are not directly
observable but still play a vital role in the policy process. The natural rates of output and
unemployment are prominent examples. Forming inferences about these variables requires a
statistical model that species how they are related to observed data. Given the uncertainty
over such models and in published data, it is common for real-time estimates of the natural
rates to be way o the mark (e.g., Kuttner, 1994; Orphanides and van Norden, 2002).
Because monetary policy depends on the central bank's current perception of the state
of the economy, correctly interpreting historical policy behavior demands that one account
for the type of informational limitations described above. Athanasios Orphanides was one
of the rst to point this out in a series of inuential papers (e.g., Orphanides, 2001; 2002;
2004) that questioned the value of policy analysis based on data and concepts other than
what policymakers actually encountered at the time decisions were being made. Using the
simple rule proposed by Taylor (1993) as an example, Orphanides (2001) showed that policy
recommendations implied by real-time data are often at odds with those obtained from ex
post revised data. Moreover, estimating such rules using only the latest information can
obscure one's view of the way monetary authorities reacted to economic conditions as they
appeared at the time. To identify the policy motives of the past, it is thus imperative to
understand what the central bank was seeing at the moment their policies were implemented.
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The papers written by Orphanides belong to a large literature that uses the Taylor rule
as a means of describing historical monetary policy (e.g., Clarida, Gal, and Gertler, 2000).
Yet, some have argued that these rules are hard to interpret because the feedback coecients
do not map uniquely into the \deep" parameters that represent the preferences of the policy
authority. The key insight is that Taylor-type rules can be derived endogenously by solving
an explicit optimization problem for the central bank (e.g., Svensson, 1997). It follows that
estimated policy-rule coecients may depend on the various weights in the central bank's
objective function in addition to the parameters characterizing the structure of the economy.
Disentangling the two requires an econometric procedure that specically acknowledges the
policymaker's optimization problem during the course of estimation (e.g., Favero and Rovelli,
2003; Ozlale, 2003; Dennis, 2006; Salemi, 2006). The usual strategy adopted in this literature
is to estimate a model of private behavior subject to the restriction that monetary policy is
optimal. Such an exercise enables one to obtain joint estimates of the structural parameters
and the weights in the policy objective function that identify central bank preferences.
To date, most of the papers that try to explain policy as the outcome of an optimization
problem assume that private agents and the central bank are perfectly informed about the
state of the economy. Since there is no conict between real-time and revised concepts under
perfect information, the models featured in this literature are typically estimated with ex post
revised data. However, this type of analysis appears as vulnerable to the Orphanides critique
as analyses based on the Taylor rule, which treats central bank behavior as a primitive rather
than the product of rational optimization. By endowing agents with full information and
ignoring the intrinsic uncertainty of real-time data, the researcher is viewing history through
a distorted lens. Attempts to validate such a model empirically may produce biased estimates
of the economic structure and, in particular, the policy objective function.
Our paper continues the line of research dating back to Salemi (1995) that estimates
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the parameters of the central bank's objective function.1 However, we break from standard
practice by utilizing a model in which agents only have partial knowledge of the state. Every
period private agents and the central bank derive an optimal estimate of the state vector
by ltering information contained in a small set of noisy indicators. The central bank then
implements an optimal policy conditional on its current beliefs while the private sector forms
expectations consistent with the chosen policy. Thus in our model economic decisions depend
on real-time perceptions of the state instead of the actual state as would be the case under
complete information. The optimal-ltering (signal-extraction) mechanism also provides a
way to track the evolution of these perceptions through time. Orphanides (2004) contends
that both features are essential for correctly identifying historical policy objectives.
Estimation is performed on a simple new-Keynesian model of output-ination dynamics.
The concept of natural output has a dual role; it appears as an exogenous forcing variable
in the Phillips curve and as the target for real output in the policy objective function.
Regarding the information structure, we assume that private agents and the central bank
observe noisy current-period measures of output growth, ination, and the unemployment
rate, the latter of which is linked to the model through an Okun's Law relationship. Using
the methodological approach outlined in Svensson and Woodford (2003), both sets of agents
obtain an ecient estimate of the state vector by means of a Kalman-lter updating equation.
Given its estimate of the state, the central bank sets the nominal interest rate to minimize
a weighted quadratic loss function under discretion. The arguments in the loss function
include deviations of ination and output from target and changes in the interest rate.
To estimate our partial information model, we employ a data set that combines real-time
and ex post revised data spanning the Federal Reserve chairmanships of Volcker, Greenspan,
and Bernanke. Using real-time data to estimate the loss function is a departure from much of
1Early examples in this literature are Cecchetti, McConnell, and Perez-Quiros (2002), Dennis (2004),
Soderstrom, Soderlind, and Vredin (2005), and Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes, and Krause (2006). More recent
contributions include Givens and Salemi (2008), Ilbas (2012), and Givens (2012).
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the extant literature that relies exclusively on revised data (e.g., Dennis, 2006; Ilbas, 2012).
In those studies omitting noisy real-time data makes sense because agents are assumed to
know the true value of the state at each point in time. By contrast, our model recognizes a
distinction between the true state variables and the group of indicators that agents observe
in real time. The consistent approach here is to identify the former with ex post revised data
but the latter with data that was actually available when past decisions were made.
In short, the goal of this paper is to underscore the empirical consequences of placing
information constraints on a model with optimal monetary policy. To fully achieve that
goal, we take a page from the previous literature by estimating a second model that diers
only in its assumption that agents have complete knowledge of the state of the economy.
We then report those estimates alongside our benchmark estimates obtained under partial
information. Comparing results across the two models claries the eect that informational
assumptions have on estimates of the structural parameters and loss function weights.
Our ndings suggest that uncertainty about the state has a major impact on inferences
concerning the output objective in the policy loss function. Under partial information the
weight on the output gap term (i.e., the gap between actual output and the natural rate)
relative to ination exceeds one-fourth and is statistically signicant. Under complete infor-
mation the relative weight on output gap stability is small and not signicantly dierent from
zero, echoing results from previous studies that disregard informational frictions altogether.
Estimates of the policy equation reveal that conict between tting the observed interest
rate path and satisfying the restrictions imposed by discretionary policy is greatly dimin-
ished in the partial information version of our model. We base this conclusion on various
tests of the hypothesis that policy was optimal during the sample period. Specically, we
employ a likelihood ratio test as well as the Bayesian information criterion and a related
pseudo-posterior odds ratio to assess the t of the optimal-policy model compared to a
nested alternative that leaves the policy equation free. Results from all three show that
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the discrepancy between the two policies is considerably smaller in a partial information
framework, implying that optimal and historical monetary policy are more easily reconciled
under partial information than under complete information.
A key step in establishing the validity of our partial information mechanism is checking
whether the uncertainties are sucient to generate meaningful perception errors over time.
If the estimated model tells us that real-time perceptions of the state were never far from
the true state, then accounting for partial information may oer scant improvement over full
information in eorts to identify historical policy motives. We perform this check by esti-
mating past output gap and ination misperceptions with the Kalman smoother. Estimates
reveal that beliefs about the state were at times very dierent from reality, particularly with
regard to the output gap. Moreover, variance decompositions show that output gap mis-
perceptions were mainly driven by shocks to the natural rates of output and unemployment
while ination misperceptions were largely the result of cost-push shocks and indicator noise.
1.1 Related Literature
Our paper is part of a growing literature that incorporates partial information into a new-
Keynesian framework. Dotsey and Hornstein (2003) and Coenen, Levin, and Wieland (2005)
assess the information content of money using models calibrated to US and euro area data,
respectively. Both studies nd that money provides little information about the state of the
economy that is useful for stabilization policy. Ehrmann and Smets (2003) and Cukierman
and Lippi (2005) characterize optimal policy under conditions where the true value of natural
output is unknown. The information problem causes agents to make systematic prediction
errors when estimating the output gap, which in turn biases the policy setting away from
a full information benchmark.2 Dellas (2006) and Collard and Dellas (2010) show that
2Aoki (2003) studies optimal monetary policy under similar conditions and nds that partial information
justies a more cautious response to noisy indicators.
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mismeasurement of the state along with a forecasting rule derived from the Kalman lter
helps the new-Keynesian model produce an inertial response of ination to monetary shocks.
Collard, Dellas, and Smets (2009) use Bayesian methods to estimate a DSGE model with the
same type of information structure. They nd that partial information acts as an endogenous
propagation mechanism and improves the t of the model in terms of log likelihood.
The paper that is perhaps closest to ours is Lippi and Neri (2007). They too estimate
a model with partial information and optimal discretionary policy, but our analysis diers
from their's in many important ways. First, we estimate our model with US data, whereas
Lippi and Neri estimate on euro area data. Second, Lippi and Neri only report estimates
under partial information because their main emphasis is on comparing the signal quality of
real money balances and unit labor costs. Our task is to examine the implications of partial
information per se, so we also consider a complete information model and report the two sets
of estimates side-by-side. Third, Lippi and Neri estimate their model with ex post revised
data alone. We use both real-time and ex post revised data simultaneously during estimation.
Exploiting the information present in real-time data should yield a more accurate depiction
of historical policy, as argued by Orphanides (2001) and Croushore (2011).
Few studies in this literature employ real-time data during the course of estimation. Neri
and Ropele (2011) is a recent example of one that does. They apply Bayesian methods
to estimate a new-Keynesian model with partial information a la Svensson and Woodford
(2003). There are two key areas in which our paper departs from their's. First, Neri and
Ropele represent policy with a Taylor rule and use the estimated model to compute the im-
plied output gap-ination volatility tradeo facing the European Central Bank. We restrict
policy to be the outcome of optimal discretion in order to recover the weights in the Federal
Reserve's loss function. Second, Neri and Ropele estimate partial and complete information
versions of their model using either ex post revised or real-time data separately. They do
not consider a version that uses both types of data at the same time.
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2 An Empirical Model with Partial Information
This section presents a new-Keynesian model with partial information and optimal discre-
tionary policy. We dene partial information as the inability of economic agents to perfectly
observe the state. Thus the information problem is restricted to items in the state vector;
the model and its parameters are known with certainty. Each period agents update their be-
liefs with the arrival of new information (i.e., data) on the indicator variables, which include
measures of output growth, ination, and the unemployment rate. The economic structure
consists of an IS equation, a Phillips curve, a stochastic process for natural output, an Okun's
Law relationship, and a loss function describing the stabilization goals of monetary policy.
2.1 The IS Equation
The aggregate demand component of the model is characterized by an IS equation
yt = yt+1jt 1 + (1  )[yt 1 + (1  )yt 2]  (it 1   tjt 1) + "y;t; (1)
where yt is real output, it is the one-period nominal interest rate, t is the ination rate,
and "y;t is a demand shock, assumed to be i:i:d: N(0; 
2
y). For any variable zt, z jt denotes
E[z j
t], the expected value (optimal prediction) of z conditional on the date-t information
set 
t. In our model the policymaker and private agents have symmetric information.
When  = 1 Eq. (1) resembles the modern new-Keynesian specication of aggregate
demand based on the consumption Euler equation, in which  is the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution (e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997). Augmenting the IS equation with
lags ( < 1) represents a departure from strict micro-foundations but is necessary to cap-
ture persistent aspects of the data, as discussed by Estrella and Fuhrer (2002). Following
Rudebusch (2002), Eq. (1) contains an explicit lag in the transmission from the ex ante
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real interest rate to output and on the information set for expectations formation. Svensson
(1997) asserts that these kinds of adjustment and processing lags, which together give rise
to a delayed reaction of output to changes in policy, are crucial aspects of monetary policy
that should feature prominently in models of ination targeting.
2.2 The Phillips Curve
Ination dynamics are governed by a Phillips curve
t = t+1jt 1 + (1  )t 1 + (yt 1   ynt 1) + ";t; (2)
which relates ination to past and expected future ination and the output gap, dened
as the deviation of actual output from its natural level. The conceptual framework for Eq.
(2) is a model of monopolistically competitive rms that adjust prices infrequently. The
cyclical factor determining the size of price adjustments is real marginal cost, which varies
proportionately with the output gap under certain conditions (e.g., Woodford, 2003). In such
an environment, parameter  is inversely related to the duration of price xity. The variable
";t is viewed as an exogenous \cost-push" shock and is assumed to be i:i:d: N(0; 
2
).
The rationale for including lagged ination ( < 1) is mainly empirical. Fuhrer (1997)
argues that purely forward-looking Phillips curves produce \jump" dynamics for ination
that are at odds with the type of inertial responses evident in the data. As in Rudebusch
(2002), we embed a transmission lag from the output gap to ination and an information lag
in the dating of expectations. The combination of these two ensures that current ination
is predetermined and that policy changes aect prices by altering expected future ination
one period before being transmitted through the output gap.3
Natural output ynt plays a central role in the model, both as a driving force for ination
3A shift in it has an immediate impact on t+2jt, which in turn aects the equilibrium value of t+1.
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and as a target for monetary policy. As is standard in the new-Keynesian literature, we view
natural output as the level that prevails in the absence of sticky prices and market power.
The key dierence here is that agents do not observe ynt directly, but instead must estimate
it every period by solving a particular signal-extraction problem. Although values of ynt are
unseen, its stochastic process is known with certainty. Specically, natural output follows
ynt = y
n
t 1 + "n;t + y"y;t; (3)
where jj < 1. Fluctuations in ynt originate from two dierent shocks. The rst shock,
"n;t, immediately aects the state of natural output and is assumed to be i:i:d: N(0; 
2
n).
Numerous studies interpret this kind of shock as a productivity innovation (e.g., Clarida,
Gal, and Gertler, 1999). The second shock is the demand shock, "y;t, which enters the law of
motion for ynt with coecient y  0. In a general equilibrium setting with nominal rigidities,
natural output is driven by supply (productivity) and demand shocks, the latter of which
can be attributed to things like shifts in consumer preferences (e.g., Erceg, Henderson, and
Levin, 2000). Permitting correlation between natural output and aggregate demand shocks
is consistent with the theoretical framework that underlies this class of models.
2.3 Okun's Law
The data used to estimate simple new-Keynesian models is usually limited to measures of
real output, ination, and a nominal interest rate (e.g., Lubik and Schorfheide, 2004; Linde,
2005). In the real world, however, central banks and market participants forecast the state
by ltering information from numerous economic variables that are not always present in
stylized models (e.g., Boivin and Giannoni, 2006). To partially capture this dynamic, we
augment Eqs. (1) - (3) with an equation linking the unemployment rate, a key indicator of
cyclical conditions, to the output gap. This allows unemployment data to be used by agents
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for signal extraction and by the econometrician for estimating the structural parameters.
Unemployment enters the model by means of an Okun's Law relationship
ut   unt =  (yt   ynt ); (4)
where ut and u
n
t are the actual and natural rates of unemployment. Natural unemployment is
understood to be the rate at which there is no incipient pressure on ination stemming from
imbalances between yt and y
n
t . Eqs. (2) and (4) imply that when ut = u
n
t , the only forces
acting on ination are \cost-push" shocks.4 Like ynt , we assume that u
n
t is not observable, but
its stochastic process is part of 
t. We follow Staiger, Stock, and Watson (2001) in describing
natural unemployment as a random walk: unt = u
n
t 1 + "u;t, and "u;t is i:i:d: N(0; 
2
u).
When there is no uncertainty about the state of the economy, unemployment is irrelevant
for policy since it has no causal role in the dynamics of other variables and is not an argument
in the loss function (see below). In the more realistic case where uncertainty exists, however,
unemployment may carry useful information on unobservable components of the state that
are important for stabilization, such as the natural level of output. It follows that changes
in the unemployment rate that are thought to reect movements in payo-relevant variables
indirectly aect the dynamics of the model by inducing shifts in the policy instrument.
2.4 The Loss Function
The central bank selects it each period to minimize the loss function
Lt = E
"
(1  )
1X
j=0
jf2t+j + y(yt+j   ynt+j)2 + i(it+j   it+j 1)2g

t# ; (5)
4Our denition of natural unemployment diers somewhat from the long-run concept of Friedman (1968)
and Phelps (1968), who describe it as the unemployment rate to which an economy would converge given
structural features of the labor market. While our model does not explain the determinants of long-run
unemployment, the fact that the Phillips curve coecients on past and future ination sum to one implies
that it is consistent with the Phelps-Friedman natural rate hypothesis.
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where  2 (0; 1). Eq. (5) embodies the preferences of a policymaker whose goals are to
stabilize ination and output around their target values and to achieve a smooth path for
the interest rate. The ination target is assumed to be constant and is normalized to zero.
The time-varying output target is given by the natural level of output ynt . The \smoothing"
term i(it+j   it+j 1)2, which penalizes big swings in the policy instrument, is empirically
compelling because it helps account for the serial correlation apparent in interest rate data
(e.g., Soderstrom et al., 2005). Parameters y  0 and i  0 are the weights on the output
gap and interest-rate smoothing objectives relative to ination. Together they characterize
the preferences of monetary policy since their values determine how much the central bank
trades o one stabilization goal for another. The loss function weights are the key objects of
interest in this paper. As such, they are treated as free parameters that are to be estimated
jointly with the coecients of the structural model.
2.5 The Indicator Variables
Economic agents have limited information on the state of the economy. At the beginning of
each period, they receive signals on three variables from which they must infer the true value
of the full state vector. The rst two signals, or indicators, are noisy measures of output
growth and ination represented by
yot = yt + vg;t (6)
ot = t + vp;t; (7)
where vg;t and vp;t are measurement shocks that capture the noise in the observations of yt
and t rst released (e.g., by a statistical agency) in period t.
5 We allow for possible serial
5 denotes the rst dierence operator.
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correlation in the measurement errors by modeling them as autoregressive processes
vg;t = gvg;t 1 + "g;t (8)
vp;t = pvp;t 1 + "p;t; (9)
where jgj < 1, jpj < 1, "g;t  i:i:d: N(0; 2g), and "p;t  i:i:d: N(0; 2p).
Measurement shocks aect the information problem that agents confront in a signicant
way. Suppose that g = p = 0, implying that the true values of output and ination
were observable. It is clear from the IS equation that market participants and the central
bank would be able to perfectly derive aggregate demand shocks each period. Furthermore,
the only uncertainty surrounding ination would be in distinguishing cost-push shocks from
shocks to natural output. When both indicators are contaminated with noise (i.e., g; p >
0), identifying the sources of aggregate uctuations is more challenging and subject to greater
uncertainty. An observed change in output growth could be due to a demand shock or a
measurement shock. Similarly, an increase in ination could be the result of rising output,
declining natural output, a cost-push shock, or a positive measurement shock. Given their
knowledge of the economy, information-constrained agents assign certain probabilities to
each of these scenarios in forming an optimal estimate of the state.
The third indicator is the unemployment rate ut. Because it depends on the true output
gap via Okun's Law, unemployment can have signicant information content in a setting
where agents receive noisy signals on output growth and ination and natural output is
unknown. However, ut also varies in response to unobserved shifts in the natural rate of un-
employment unt , which degrades the quality of the information it provides on current output
gap conditions. In fact, observations on ut are uninformative in the course of forecasting the
state if the variance of unt is large. This turns out to be the case in our model because the
natural rate follows a random walk, implying that the variance of unt is unbounded. As a
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practical matter, we rst dierence Eq. (4) to obtain
ut =  (yt   ynt ) + (yt 1   ynt 1) + "u;t; (10)
and assume that agents observe the change in the unemployment rate ut. Knowledge of
ut is potentially valuable since uctuations in "u;t are stationary. Thus one implication of
modeling unt as a random walk process is that the information content of the unemployment
rate actually resides in the rst dierence of this series.
3 Optimal Policy and Signal Extraction
Using the notation in Svensson and Woodford (2003), we express the model compactly as
264 Xt+1
 xt+1jt
375 = A1
264 Xt
xt
375+ A2
264 Xtjt
xtjt
375+Bit +
264 N"t+1
021
375 ; (11)
where Xt = [yt t y
n
t yt 1 it 1 y
n
t 1 "u;t vg;t vp;t]
0 are the date-t predetermined variables,
xt = [yt+1jt t+1jt]0 are the date-t forward-looking variables, it is the policy instrument, and
"t+1 = ["y;t+1 ";t+1 "n;t+1 "u;t+1 "g;t+1 "p;t+1]
0 are the i:i:d: shocks with covariance matrix .
The parameters of the model appear as elements of the matrices A1, A2, B,  , and N .6
The policymaker and the private sector do not have full information about the state of the
economy, that is, about the individual elements of Xt and xt. Instead, they only observe the
indicator variables, collected in a vector Zt, which can be used to form optimal predictions
of Xt and xt at each point in time. In this model the indicators are related to the state by
Zt = DXt; (12)
6Appendix A shows how Eqs. (1) - (10) can be mapped into the general linear-quadratic form used by
Svensson and Woodford (2003).
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where Zt = [y
o
t 
o
t ut]
0 and D is a (39) selection matrix.7 The information set available
to agents in period t is thus 
t  fZ ;   t;A1; A2; B; ; N;D;; ; y; ig.
Eq. (12) is a special case of the general formulation used by Svensson and Woodford
(2003) in which Zt contains both predetermined and forward-looking variables. Forward-
looking indicators complicate the signal-extraction problem because they depend, by de-
nition, on expected future endogenous variables. These expectations, in turn, depend on
an estimate of the state, which is itself a function of the indicators. The authors develop
new techniques to handle this circularity issue and present the results in terms of a modied
Kalman lter.8 In our model all of the indicator variables are predetermined. As a result,
the standard Kalman lter is sucient for computing optimal forecasts of the state vector.9
3.1 Optimization under Discretion
The central bank conducts optimal monetary policy under discretion. As such, it minimizes
the loss function period-by-period subject to Eq. (11) conditional on 
t. The equilibrium is
one in which the policy functions depend only on current predetermined variables.
Svensson and Woodford (2003) show that the policy setting and estimates of the forward-
looking variables depend linearly on current estimates of the predetermined variables,
it = FXtjt; (13)
xtjt = GXtjt; (14)
7Note that vg;t and vp;t are embedded in Xt rather than appearing as explicit shocks to Eq. (12).
8These ndings extend work by Pearlman, Currie, and Levine (1986) showing that estimation of the state
can be obtained by means of a Kalman lter in forward-looking models with partial symmetric information.
9A case involving forward-looking indicators is examined in Appendix C, where we estimate a version of
the model that removes all transmission and information lags so that current output and ination are no
longer predetermined. The estimation results are broadly similar to the ones reported in section 5.
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where F solves a particular matrix Ricatti equation, G is a xed point of the relation
G = (A22    GA12) 1[( GA11   A21) + ( GB1  B2)F ];
and fA11; A12; A21; A22; B1; B2g are the partitions of A  A1 + A2 and B with dimensions
conformable to Xt and xt. Substituting Eq. (14) into the lower block of Eq. (11) gives
xt = G
1Xt +G
2Xtjt; (15)
with G1 =  (A122) 1A121 and G2 = G G1. It follows that predetermined variables obey
Xt+1 = HXt + JXtjt +N"t+1; (16)
where H = A111 + A
1
12G
1 and J = A112G
2 + A211 + A
2
12G+B1F .
3.2 Optimal Filtering
To fully characterize the dynamics of the endogenous variables, the law of motion for Xtjt
must be specied. Since none of the forward-looking variables are observable, estimates of
the predetermined variables can be obtained from a standard Kalman lter. The recursive
updating equation expressed in terms of innovations to Xt is given by
Xtjt = Xtjt 1 +KD(Xt  Xtjt 1); (17)
where the steady-state gain matrix K = PD0(DPD0) 1. The matrix P is the covariance of
the prediction error Xt  Xtjt 1 which satises P = H[P   PD0(DPD0) 1DP ]H 0 +NN 0.
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Finally, taking conditional expectations of Eq. (16) gives
Xt+1jt = (H + J)Xtjt; (18)
which completes the description of equilibrium dynamics under partial information.10
A benet of modeling the optimal-ltering problem is that it provides an estimate of the
Kalman gain matrix.11 The elements of this matrix correspond to the weights agents put
on innovations in the various indicators when revising their forecasts of the predetermined
variables. In other words, K describes how new information is used in updating beliefs
about the state. Interestingly, the ltering weights can be determined without reference to
the policymaker's control problem. Note that the equations for K and P imply that the gain
matrix depends on A1, D, N , and  but not on y, i, or . This illustrates the well-known
separation principle in linear-quadratic models with partial information (e.g., LeRoy and
Waud, 1977). Specically, the best estimate of the state is independent of the chosen policy.
4 Estimation Strategy
The equilibrium under partial information admits a state-space representation that can be
estimated with maximum likelihood using the Kalman lter (e.g., Harvey, 1989). As in Lippi
and Neri (2007), the state vector appropriate for estimation is formed by augmenting the
predetermined variables Xt with conditional forecasts Xtjt 1. Thus for our model the state
is an (18 1) object st  [X 0t X 0tjt 1]0 whose dynamics are governed by a transition equation
st+1 =Mst +N"t+1: (19)
10Appendix A provides a derivation of the Kalman-lter updating equation for this model.
11An estimate of the gain matrix K is presented in Appendix D along with a brief discussion of the results.
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Elements of the (1818) matrixM and the (186) matrix N are functions of the structural
parameters, and "t+1 = ["y;t+1 ";t+1 "n;t+1 "u;t+1 "g;t+1 "p;t+1]
0 is a vector of guassian shocks.
Estimation requires modeling the joint evolution of Xt and Xtjt 1 since these two vectors are
determined simultaneously by Eqs. (16) and (18) after substituting out Xtjt using Eq. (17).
Closing the state-space model is a measurement equation linking variables observed by
the econometrician to the state st. Unlike economic agents who only observe the indicators
Zt = [y
o
t 
o
t ut]
0 along with the policy rate it, we assume that the econometrician sees
not just Zt and it but also the true values of output growth yt and ination t. This is a
departure from Lippi and Neri (2007) and Neri and Ropele (2011) who require that economic
agents and the econometrician always observe the same data.
Our choice to give the researcher an expanded data set that includes yt and t recognizes
the distinction between economic decision making, a process carried out in real time, and
model estimation, which is an exercise in retrospection. It is well known that real-time data,
a concept made explicit in our model through the role of indicators, are often revised as more
comprehensive information becomes available and as measurement techniques improve. With
the benet of hindsight, the econometrician should be able to condition estimation on revised
data even though such data would not have been accessible to agents in real time. Below
we argue that ex post revised data, while not perfect, are the best available measures of the
true variables that the structural model seeks to explain but that agents never fully observe.
Dening yt  [yot ot ut it yt t]0, the measurement equation takes the form
yt = Tst + ut: (20)
Elements of the (6 18) matrix T are reduced-form coecients and ut  [0 0 0 ui;t 0 0]0.12
The variable ui;t is a measurement shock with distribution i:i:d: N(0; 
2
i ); it represents the
12Appendix A shows how to derive Eqs. (19) and (20) and how to construct matrices M, N, and T.
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\stochastic wedge" between the sample interest rate and the rate prescribed by optimal
discretion. The role of ui;t is to circumvent the stochastic singularity that would occur if the
observed interest rate responded only to st (e.g., Ingram, Kocherlakota, and Savin, 1994).
Estimation requires data for the variables in yt observed by agents and those seen ex-
clusively by the econometrician. In choosing yot and 
o
t , we follow Orphanides (2001) who
argues that real-time data accurately represent the information that was available to pol-
icymakers and market participants who were around at the time economic decisions were
being made. Our data source is the Real-Time Data Set for Macroeconomists published by
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.13 We dene yot as the annualized rst dierence
of the log of seasonally-adjusted real output (ROUTPUTQvQd), converted to per-capita
terms by subtracting the log growth rate of the civilian noninstitutional population. In
constructing this series, we take the last output growth calculation from each \vintage" of
data published (quarterly) over the sample period. Using the same procedure, readings on
the annualized rst dierence of the log of the seasonally-adjusted output deator (PQvQd)
provide our measure of ot .
14
The data used to assemble real-time measures of output growth and ination undergo
a continual process of revision in the months and years following their initial release (e.g.,
Croushore and Stark, 2001). As a result, the \true" values of these concepts remain unknown
for a long time after the date of rst publication. In light of this fact, we assume that
observations of yt and t correspond to \nal" published data, that is, the complete time
series as recorded in the latest available release.15 Of course, even nal data is subject to
13http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/real-time-data/
14We have assumed that error-prone measures of output growth and ination are observed by agents
contemporaneously, even though preliminary data from the national income and product accounts is actually
released with a one-quarter lag. We estimated a version of the model that accounts for the publication lag
by setting Zt = [y
o
t 1 
o
t 1 ut]
0. The results were very similar to the ones reported here.
15We choose not to model the nature or timing of data revisions in this paper. Instead, the cumulative
eect of the full history of revisions to any given data point are encapsulated in our model by the measurement
shocks vg;t and vp;t, dened as the dierence between real-time observations of output growth and ination
and their nal values. Although agents are unable to perfectly infer vg;t and vp;t like the econometrician
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uncertainty and will likely be revised again in the future. Nevertheless, we view it as oering
the most reliable account of the true historical proles of output growth and ination.16
Finally, the information structure implies that private agents and the econometrician
have the same data on unemployment and the nominal interest rate. Our measure for it is
the annual yield on three-month US Treasury bills. For the unemployment series we use the
seasonally-adjusted civilian unemployment rate (RUC). Our assumption that agents observe
the true value of ut in real time is based on reports showing that revisions to unemployment
data are usually small, infrequent, and conned to seasonal factors (e.g., Kozicki, 2004).
Fig. 1 plots the historical time series for the variables in the econometrician's data set.
Each one has been de-meaned prior to estimation, except for ut whose sample mean is very
near zero to begin with. Observations on output growth, ination, and the interest rate are
therefore interpreted as annual percentage points less their sample averages. Readings on
ut are expressed as percentage-point changes in the quarterly unemployment rate. Rather
than display the actual series for yot and 
o
t , Fig. 1 plots the dierences between real-time
and nal revised values for output growth and ination. Viewing the real-time data in this
way makes it easier to spot periods where large ex post revisions occurred.
Our sample period runs from 1979:Q3 - 2010:Q1, dates that span the Federal Reserve
chairmanships of Paul Volcker, Alan Greenspan, and Ben Bernanke. The conventional wis-
dom is that a fundamental shift in US monetary policy occurred soon after Volcker's ap-
pointment in August 1979. Since we do not address the possibility of structural breaks in
the policy parameters, we estimate our model over a period of time that can be plausibly
characterized as having a stable monetary regime.
can, they have complete knowledge of their stochastic properties when forecasting the state.
16The series for yt and t are based on historical data published during the nal quarter of 2010. At the
time of writing, the 2010:Q4 vintage was the most up-to-date and allowed for two consecutive revisions to
the last observation in our sample.
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4.1 A Model with Complete Information
Throughout the paper we will be comparing results of the partial information model to those
from a version that assumes complete information. Under complete information agents have
full knowledge of the state of the economy at all times. This is accomplished by setting the
matrixD in Eq. (12) equal to the identity matrix, so that the true values of all predetermined
variables are seen each period.17 Clearly, full information obviates the signal-extraction
problem used to track agents' beliefs when information is incomplete. As a result, the
equilibrium with discretionary policy can be found by applying standard solution methods
for linear-quadratic control problems without a ltering component (e.g., Soderlind, 1999).
Another dierence between partial and complete information concerns the data used for
estimation. When agents know the true values of yt and t, the measurement shocks in
Eqs. (6) and (7) vanish (i.e., g = p = 0). Using real-time data on output growth and
ination along with the true values as recorded in the latest data vintage would render the
model stochastically singular because yot = yt and 
o
t = t in this case. Consequently, we
drop yot and 
o
t from the measurement equation and estimate the model using only data
on unemployment, the interest rate, and the revised series for output growth and ination.
5 Empirical Findings
5.1 Parameter Estimates
Table 1 displays maximum-likelihood estimates and standard errors of the parameters ap-
pearing in Eqs. (1) - (10).18 The rst column presents estimates for the benchmark model
under partial information. The second column presents estimates for the case in which the
17A more detailed exposition of the complete information model can be found in Appendix B.
18Robust standard errors are computed as the square roots of the diagonal elements of the variance-
covariance matrix proposed by White (1982).
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policymaker and private agents have complete information on the state of the economy.
There are many similarities but also some important dierences between estimates of the
partial and complete information models. Looking rst at the structural shocks, estimates
of y and  indicate that demand shocks are about one-third less volatile than cost-push
shocks in both models. Estimates of n, however, reveal that shocks to natural output are
almost twice as volatile under partial information. Moreover, the impact of demand shocks
on natural output as measured by y is weaker when agents have limited information. The
estimate of y is 0.32 in this case compared to 0.46 under full information. Regarding shocks
to the natural rate of unemployment, the estimate of u is 0.08 under partial information
but 0.17 under complete information. Both are statistically signicant despite their small
size relative to other shocks in the model.
Estimating the partial information model with real-time data enables us to identify the
measurement shocks vg;t and vp;t in Eqs. (6) and (7). Estimates of g and p reveal that the
noise component of ot is larger on average than that of y
o
t . Both estimates are also statis-
tically signicant and of the same order of magnitude as the \fundamental" shocks entering
the IS equation and the Phillips curve. We also nd little evidence of serial correlation.
Estimates of g and p are in the neighborhood of zero and statistically insignicant.
The partial and complete information models have fairly similar implications for the IS
and Phillips curves but dier somewhat with regard to Okun's Law. Estimates of , for
example, are close to one-third, implying that both lagged and expected future output play
a key role in the IS equation. Estimates of , the interest-rate elasticity of output, are small
but signicant only in the partial information case. Estimates of  are around one-half, which
suggests that past and future ination are equally important for explaining current ination
in the Phillips curve. Estimates of the output gap elasticity  are small and imprecise but
within the range typical of the literature (e.g., Kiley, 2007). Finally, the estimate of the
Okun coecient  is 0.38 under partial information, which is about 20 percent smaller than
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the corresponding estimate under complete information.
Turning to the loss function, the estimate of i is 0.76 in the partial information model
but only 0.16 under complete information.19 Although the dierence between the estimates
may be economically signicant, the standard errors suggest that neither is statistically
dierent from zero. Our results contrast those reported by Dennis (2004), Soderstrom et
al. (2005), and Dennis (2006) showing that optimal and observed policy actions can be
reconciled with a large and signicant weight on interest-rate smoothing, albeit in a full
information environment. Incorporating limited information in the present model evidently
helps raise the smoothing penalty. Nevertheless, the uncertainty surrounding our estimate
of i makes it dicult to draw precise conclusions about the past concern for interest-rate
smoothing as an explicit policy goal. Studies that nd similar evidence include Favero and
Rovelli (2003), Salemi (2006), and Givens (2012).
Where information restrictions have a more clear-cut impact is on inferences concerning
the output gap objective. The estimate of y under partial information is 0.27 with a stan-
dard error of 0.12, while under complete information the estimate is 0.15 and the standard
error 0.50. Thus macroeconomic outcomes, if viewed from the perspective of the partial
information model, are consistent with the notion that policymakers place signicant weight
on stabilizing the output gap. This is an important result because it points to a dierent
interpretation of historical policy motives than would otherwise emerge had we conned our
analysis to the case of full information. It may also provide an answer for why studies often
nd y to be insignicant (e.g., Dennis, 2006; Salemi, 2006) despite public statements from
leading central bankers suggesting that output and ination are independently important
as exemplied by the Federal Reserve's \dual mandate" (e.g., Mishkin, 2007). Our nd-
ings suggest that it could be due to the failure of these studies to account for the type of
19We x the discount factor  = 0:99 prior to estimation. Stress tests showed that the remaining estimates
are not overly sensitive to small variations in  for either model.
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information constraints that policymakers face in real time.
To further assess the signicance of the output stabilization goal, we conduct likelihood
ratio tests of the hypothesis that y = 0. Signicance tests that rely on standard errors can be
distorted by inaccuracies in evaluating the Hessian. When estimates of the restricted model
are available, a likelihood ratio test is preferred because it does not reference standard errors.
Columns three and four of Table 1 report estimates for the partial and complete information
models under the restriction y = 0.
20 Omitting the output gap under partial information
lowers log likelihood from  671:25 to  675:56, producing a chi-square statistic of 8.61 (p-
value < 0:01). Applying the same procedure to the complete information model generates a
chi-square statistic of 0.08 (p-value is 0.78). The hypothesis that y = 0 is therefore rejected
by the data in the partial information case. By contrast, the complete information model
appears to t the data equally well with or without an output gap term in the loss function.
To recap, we nd that incorporating uncertainty into the model in the form of a partially
observed state changes the estimates of certain parameters in a signicant way. Chief among
them is the relative weight on the output gap in the central bank's loss function, which is
nearly twice as large and far more precise under partial information than under complete
information. Estimates of some of the non-policy parameters are also sensitive to the infor-
mation structure, notably the Okun coecient and the variances of the shocks to natural
output and unemployment. Taken together, our results lend support to the central argument
put forward by Orphanides (2001) and illustrate the importance of basing historical analysis
on realistic assumptions about the information available to decision makers in real time.
20In the complete information model the null hypothesis is y = 1e-5. Initial attempts at estimating the
model with y = 0 caused (; i) ! (0; 0), producing an indeterminate equilibrium under discretionary
policy. We found that y = 1e-5 was small enough to form inferences about the statistical contribution of
y without causing our estimates to drift into the indeterminacy region of the parameter space.
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5.2 Tests of Policy Optimality
A central task of this paper is to determine whether our partial information framework can
resolve the conict between optimal policy and observed policy that has been frequently
reported in the literature (e.g., Rudebusch, 2001; Dennis, 2006; Salemi, 2006). One way to
accomplish this is to formally test the parameter restrictions implied by discretionary policy
in both the partial and complete information models. This involves estimating the model
once with the optimal-policy restrictions imposed and once with those restrictions relaxed
and then testing whether the model ts the data equally well in the two cases. If accounting
for imperfect information helps to reconcile historical and optimal policy, we should nd it
harder (in a statistical sense) to reject the optimality hypothesis under partial information
than under complete information.
To organize a valid test of the optimal-policy restrictions, we estimate a version of the
model that does not force central bank actions to be the product of loss minimization. Specif-
ically, we replace Eq. (5) with an unconstrained rule for the interest rate that xes distinct
response coecients to the predetermined variables comprising the state. This arrangement
nests optimal discretion as a special case since the latter results from conditioning estimation
on the requirement that policy-rule coecients jointly minimize the loss function. Table 2
displays estimates of the policy coecients under partial and complete information. In both
cases we report the unrestricted estimates, obtained by relaxing the coecient restrictions
tied to loss minimization, as well as the optimal coecients implied by discretionary policy.21
It is immediately clear that the discrepancy between optimal and unrestricted policy is
much smaller in the partial information case than in the complete information case. Un-
der partial information optimal responses to perceived ination and the lagged interest rate
are nearly identical to their unrestricted counterparts. The policy restrictions also do not
appear to have a signicant eect on responses to perceived levels of current and past out-
21Standard errors of the discretionary coecients are obtained using the delta method.
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put. Responses to perceived changes in natural output, however, are a bit smaller (less
accommodative) under optimal policy than under an unrestricted policy.
The picture is very dierent in the complete information case, where imposing optimal
policy substantially alters some of the coecient estimates. For example, discretion calls for
a much weaker countercyclical response to output and tighter monetary conditions following
a rise in natural output.
The tension between tting the data and satisfying the optimal-policy criteria can also be
seen in estimates of the structural parameters reported in Table 3. Notice there are only a few
parameters in the partial information case for which the estimates recovered under discretion
are signicantly dierent from those associated with the unrestricted policy. These include
the shocks to natural output n and unemployment u and perhaps the IS parameters  and
. The contrast is more prominent under complete information. Notably, estimates of  and
 point to greater forward-looking emphasis in the IS curve when policy is unconstrained,
and estimates of n and  indicate less volatility and persistence in shocks to natural output.
Because the models in each comparison group are nested, we can evaluate the optimal-
policy hypothesis using a likelihood ratio test. Under partial information log likelihood is
 665:59 when policy is unrestricted compared to  671:25 when it is optimal. Since there
are 5 free policy-rule coecients in the former but only 2 loss function weights in the latter,
discretion places 3 restrictions on the model. Thus the chi-square statistic is 11.32 (p-value
is 0.0101), indicating that the data reject the optimality hypothesis at the 5% signicance
level but not at the 1% level. Under complete information the policy restrictions decrease
log likelihood from  406:90 to  445:17, producing a chi-square statistic of 76.53 (p-value
< 0:0001). We therefore reject the null with a high degree of condence in this case.
Another way to evaluate the optimal-policy hypothesis is with the Bayesian information
criterion. The BIC has a couple of advantages over a likelihood ratio test. First, it penalizes
log likelihood according to the number of free parameters in the model. This often makes
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the BIC a more robust indicator of t since it is always possible to increase likelihood by
adding parameters, even though such a procedure may lead to overtting instead of actual
gains in predictive performance. Second, the BIC is asymptotically equivalent to the Bayes
estimator under certain conditions (e.g., Schwarz, 1978), thereby providing a measure of the
model's posterior odds. As explained by Kiley (2007), a pseudo-posterior probability can be
formed by using the BIC as a substitute for marginal likelihood in the ratio
M(j) = exp(BIC(j))mP
h=1
exp(BIC(h))
; (21)
where M(j) denotes the conditional probability of some candidate model j among the m
dierent models being considered. Although it has a Bayesian interpretation, the pseudo-
odds ratio depends only on the discrepancy between the approximating model and the data,
adjusted for degrees of freedom, and not on any prior beliefs about the parameter or model
space. This follows from the implicit use of equal model priors in the formation of M and
from the independence between the BIC and priors over the parameters of each model.
Log likelihood, the BIC, and the posterior model probabilities are displayed in Table 3.
Under partial information the BIC is  718:53 for the unrestricted policy but  716:97 for
optimal discretion. Between these two candidates, the pseudo-odds criterion points to an
83% probability of the discretionary model given the available data. The opposite occurs
under complete information. Loosening the optimal-policy restrictions raises the BIC from
 481:26 to  450:21, resulting in a near zero posterior probability of the discretionary model.
The results presented in this section echo the ndings of Rudebusch (2001) who shows
that incorporating real-time uncertainty about the output gap and ination is critical in
eorts to interpret historical policy as the outcome of a loss minimization problem. In-
terestingly, the similarities emerge despite some important conceptual and methodological
dierences between our two studies. One dierence is that Rudebusch uses a simple two-
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parameter Taylor rule to characterize monetary policy, whereas we consider a wider class of
policies in which the interest rate reacts to all of the variables in the state vector.22 Our
paper also diers in the procedure for identifying the best-tting optimal policy. Rudebusch
derives optimal Taylor-rule coecients using a xed structural model and loss function for
the central bank and then searches over the right mix of uncertainties until the resulting
policy coecients match the historical ones. By contrast, we impose on the underlying
model a specic information constraint and then search over eligible values of the structural
parameters and loss function weights for the combination that maximizes log likelihood.
5.3 Historical Misperceptions
Our decision to model the central bank's information problem recognizes the fact that poli-
cymakers face considerable uncertainty about the state of the economy in real time. Under
such conditions policy actions will reect current perceptions of the state rather than its
true value. Correctly interpreting historical policy, so the argument goes, requires that one
take into account how those perceptions have evolved through time. Yet, implicit in this
argument is the assumption that beliefs about the state are often far from reality; if not,
policy behavior would be very similar to the behavior suggested by estimates based on re-
vised data and perfect information. It follows that if agents' perception errors are negligible,
using a model that distinguishes the true state from real-time estimates of the state may not
be important for obtaining valid inferences of the structural parameters and loss function
weights. We investigate this concern by deriving historical estimates of the misperceptions
that actually occurred over the sample period as seen through the partial information model.
A quantitative assessment of the size and nature of those misperceptions can provide evi-
dence on whether incorporating partial information as described above is critical for the type
22Excluding a constant intercept term, the policy rule used in Rudebusch (2001) can be obtained in our
model by restricting y =  n and yy = i = 0.
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of policy analysis carried out in this paper.
In estimating the path of historical misperceptions, we focus on two variables that jointly
summarize most of the information in the state vector: the output gap and ination.23 To
be clear, by misperceptions we mean dierences between the true paths of the output gap
and ination, fqt; tgTt=1, and the paths perceived by agents in the model, fqtjt; tjtgTt=1. We
use the xed interval Kalman smoother as described in de Jong (1989) on Eqs. (19) and
(20) to estimate both the true and perceived series from 1979:Q3 to 2010:Q1. Unlike the
\one-sided" estimates produced by the standard Kalman lter, the smoother generates \two-
sided" estimates that reect data contained in the full sample. We denote the sequence of
these estimates as fq^t; ^t; q^tjt; ^tjtgTt=1. Thus for any period t, the estimated output gap
misperception is given by q^tjt   q^t and the ination misperception by ^tjt   ^t.
Figs. 2 and 3 plot the actual and perceived estimates of the output gap and ination,
respectively, as well as the corresponding real-time perceptions errors. Summary statistics on
each of these series are reported in Table 4. Regarding the output gap, our estimates point
to signicant variation in agents' misperceptions over time, ranging from  1:59 percentage
points in 1999:Q4 to 0:45 in 2010:Q1. Estimates of qtjt qt also appear to exhibit substantial
serial correlation. The rst-order autocorrelation coecient of this series is 0:93, meaning
that errors in forecasting the output gap tended to persist for many periods. Indeed, from
the end of the 1991 recession to the beginning of the most recent \Great Recession," agents
underestimated the output gap by no less than 0:49 percentage points every quarter.24
Real-time estimates of the output gap are also clearly biased in the Volcker-Greenspan-
Bernanke era. The mean dierence between q^tjt and q^t is  0:78 percentage points, indicating
that monetary authorities systematically underestimated prevailing output gap conditions.
23In this section we denote the output gap as qt  yt   ynt .
24This nding lends empirical support to the theoretical results in Cukierman and Lippi (2003) demon-
strating that retrospective errors in forecasting the output gap are generally serially correlated in models
with optimal monetary policy and partial symmetric information.
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This result is consistent with the evidence in Orphanides (2003, 2004) showing that the
Federal Reserve's assessment of the output gap in real time was uniformly lower than its
true value as recognized ex post throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. Our estimates suggest
that this bias continued until 2009:Q3. Finally, it is worth noting that uctuations in the
perception errors tend to be cyclical. Estimates of qtjt   qt peak (in absolute value) at the
end of expansions and shrink during recessions.
Estimates of actual and perceived ination displayed in Fig. 3 reveal a dierent pattern
of misperceptions than those surrounding the output gap. For example, there is little in-
dication of any bias or serial correlation in estimates of the ination misperceptions. The
average spread between ^tjt and ^t in the sample is only 0:01 percentage points, and the au-
tocorrelation coecient of ^tjt   ^t is 0:28. Nevertheless, errors in forecasting ination were
considerable at times, reaching highs of 2:52 percentage points in 2008:Q4 and lows of  2:07
in 1981:Q1. The overall volatility of ^tjt   ^t is nontrivial; the standard deviation of this
series is 0:72 percent. Interestingly, our ndings are again quite comparable to the historical
account of the Federal Reserve's outlook for ination as documented in Orphanides (2003,
2004). During the 1980s and 1990s, it was not uncommon for real-time estimates of ination
to be o by 1 or 2 percentage points. However, records also show that the Fed did not make
systematic errors like they did in forecasting the output gap, and ination misperceptions
typically vanished after a few quarters.
An advantage of using a structural model to estimate historical misperceptions is that
it allows one to identify the economic shocks most responsible for the observed variation.
The papers written by Orphanides are largely silent on this matter because real-time con-
cepts are constructed ex ante from primary source data and without reference to an explicit
model. In particular, misperceptions are obtained by subtracting real-time data published
in the Federal Reserve's Greenbook from corresponding ex post revised data.25 As a result,
25The Greenbook is prepared by the Federal Reserve Board sta before each meeting of the Federal Open
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Orphanides can only speculate on the key determinants of historical variation in the per-
ception errors. In our setup agents process incoming data eciently when forecasting the
state. Misperceptions are thus endogenous and depend on the underlying model as well as
the quality of information extracted from the indicators. This feature makes the partial
information model a useful device for examining the contribution of individual shocks to the
variability of policy misperceptions over time.
Table 5 decomposes the variances of qtjt qt and tjt t into shares attributed to each of
the model's six orthogonal shocks. Decompositions are reported at one-year, three-year, and
ten-year forecast horizons. The results indicate that shocks to the natural rates of output
and unemployment account for 90 to 95 percent of the short and long-run variance of output
gap misperceptions. Demand shocks and the noise component of output growth jointly
explain the remaining 5 to 10 percent. Cost-push shocks and the noise in observed ination,
on the other hand, have little impact on mismeasurement of the output gap in real time.
In contrast to the output gap, errors in forecasting ination are driven almost entirely by
cost-push shocks and ination noise. The other four shocks account for a negligible fraction
of the prediction error variance at usual business cycle frequencies.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper reports estimates from a new-Keynesian model of output-ination dynamics
with optimal discretionary policy under two dierent assumptions about the structure of
information. In the rst case market participants and the central bank only have partial
(symmetric) knowledge about the underlying state of the economy. Each period they form
an optimal estimate of the state by ltering the information contained in a small set of noisy
indicator variables. In the the second case agents are assumed to have complete knowledge
Market Committee. It reports projections for the current and future macroeconomic outlook, which are
made available to the public after a ve-year lag.
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of the state at all times. We estimate these two versions of the model separately using
a maximum-likelihood procedure with quarterly US data spanning the chairmanships of
Volcker, Greenspan, and Bernanke. Examining both sets of estimates side-by-side sheds
light on the various ways in which accounting for informational limitations modies our
understanding of the economic structure and, in particular, the objectives of monetary policy.
Our results show that partial information changes estimates of the Federal Reserve's loss
function and helps reconcile the conict between optimal and observed policy over the sam-
ple. Specically, the weight on output gap stability relative to ination is large and signicant
under partial information but small and imprecise under full information. A likelihood-based
assessment of the restrictions imposed by optimal discretion indicates that partial informa-
tion also improves the t of the optimal-policy model in comparison to a nested alternative
that leaves policy unrestricted. In other words, optimal and historical policy appear to be
more compatible under partial information than under complete information.
To evaluate the economic signicance of our ndings, we use the Kalman smoother on
the partial information model to recover historical estimates of both the true and perceived
values of the output gap and ination. Estimates reveal that past perceptions of the state
were at times a far cry from reality. Moreover, real-time perception errors, particularly those
associated with the output gap, were likely to persist for many quarters. This divergence
between the perceived state and the true state exposes the magnitude of informational prob-
lems that policymakers face and, therefore, the importance for proper historical analysis of
building realistic forms of uncertainty into macroeconometric models of optimal policy.
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Appendix A. The Partial Information Model
This appendix provides a comprehensive derivation of the empirical state-space model in-
troduced in section 4 of the paper. For the sake of clarity and completeness, we begin by
restating the structural equations of the new-Keynesian model.
yt = yt+1jt 1 + (1  )[yt 1 + (1  )yt 2]  (it 1   tjt 1) + "y;t; (A.1)
t = t+1jt 1 + (1  )t 1 + (yt 1   ynt 1) + ";t; (A.2)
ynt = y
n
t 1 + "n;t + y"y;t; (A.3)
ut   unt =  (yt   ynt ); (A.4)
Lt = E
"
(1  )
1X
j=0
jf2t+j + y(yt+j   ynt+j)2 + i(it+j   it+j 1)2g

t# ; (A.5)
yot = yt + vg;t (A.6)
ot = t + vp;t; (A.7)
vg;t = gvg;t 1 + "g;t (A.8)
vp;t = pvp;t 1 + "p;t; (A.9)
ut =  (yt   ynt ) + (yt 1   ynt 1) + "u;t: (A.10)
In Eqs. (A.1) - (A.10), yt and y
n
t are real and natural output, ut and u
n
t are the actual and
natural rates of unemployment, it is the one-period nominal interest rate, t is the ination
rate, "y;t is a demand shock, ";t is a \cost-push" shock, "n;t is a productivity shock, "u;t is
the innovation to the natural unemployment rate, yot and 
o
t are noisy measures of output
growth and ination, vg;t and vp;t are the corresponding noise components, and "g;t and
"p;t are the innovations to those components. For any variable zt, z jt denotes E[z j
t], the
expected value of z conditional on the private sector's date-t information set 
t. Lt is the
quantity that the central bank minimizes.
Dene Xt = [yt t y
n
t yt 1 it 1 y
n
t 1 "u;t vg;t vp;t]
0 to be the (9  1) vector of date-t
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predetermined variables, xt = [yt+1jt t+1jt]0 to be the (21) vector of date-t forward-looking
variables, and "t+1 = ["y;t+1 ";t+1 "n;t+1 "u;t+1 "g;t+1 "p;t+1]
0 to be the (6 1) vector of model
shocks with covariance matrix .
Our rst task is to write the structural equations as functions of Xt and xt. Eqs. (A.1) -
(A.10) can be written as
264 Xt+1
 xt+1jt
375 = A1
264 Xt
xt
375+ A2
264 Xtjt
xtjt
375+Bit +
264 N"t+1
021
375 ; (A.11)
where the (11  11) matrix A1, (11  11) matrix A2, (11  1) matrix B, (2  2) matrix  ,
(9 6) matrix N , and (6 6) matrix  are given by
A1 =
266666666666666666666666666666664
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0  0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 g 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p 0 0
 (1  ) 0 0  (1  )(1  ) 0 0 0 0 0 1  
   (1  )  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
377777777777777777777777777777775
B =
266666666666666666666666666666664
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0

0
377777777777777777777777777777775
  =
264  0
0 
375 A2 =
264 099 092
029 022
375
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N =
26666666666666666666666664
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
y 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
37777777777777777777777775
 =
2666666666666664
2y 0 0 0 0 0
0 2 0 0 0 0
0 0 2n 0 0 0
0 0 0 2u 0 0
0 0 0 0 2g 0
0 0 0 0 0 2p
3777777777777775
:
The next task is to express the variables observed by the policymaker and private agents
as a function of the right-hand-side variables in Eq. (A.11). Let Zt = [y
o
t 
o
t ut]
0. Then
Zt = DXt; (A.12)
where the (3 9) matrix D is dened as
D =
266664
1 0 0  1 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
  0   0   1 0 0
377775 :
The third task is to express the optimal setting of the interest rate under discretion as a
function of the right-hand-side variables in Eq. (A.11). It is useful to rst write the central
bank loss function in terms of Xt and xt. Let Yt = [t (yt   ynt ) (it   it 1)]0 be the vector
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of variables appearing in the central bank's loss function. Then
Yt = C
1
264 Xt
xt
375+ C2
264 Xtjt
xtjt
375+ Ciit;
where the (3 11) matrix C1, the (3 11) matrix C2, and the (3 1) matrix Ci are
C1 =
266664
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0  1 0 0 0 0 0 0
377775 C2 =

039 032

Ci =
266664
0
0
1
377775 :
The loss function may then be written as
L0 = E
"
(1  )
1X
t=0
tY 0tWYt

0# ; (A.13)
where W is a (3 3) diagonal matrix with non-zero elements (1; y; i). As explained in the
body of the paper, optimal discretion implies that
it = FXtjt; (A.14)
where F is the (1 9) matrix that solves the Ricatti equation characterizing optimal policy.
Our fourth task is to characterize expectations under optimal policy. Private agents'
estimates of the current forward-looking variables are related to their estimates of the pre-
determined variables according to
xtjt = GXtjt; (A.15)
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where the (2 9) matrix G is a xed point of the relation
G = (A22    GA12) 1[( GA11   A21) + ( GB1  B2)F ];
and where fA11; A12; A21; A22g are the (9  9), (9  2), (2  9), and (2  2) partitions of
A  A1 + A2 conformable to Xt and xt. Matrices fB1; B2g are the (9  1) and (2  1)
partitions of B likewise conformable to Xt and xt. It follows that under optimal discretion,
the relationship between the forward-looking variables and the predetermined variables is
given by
xt = G
1Xt +G
2Xtjt; (A.16)
where the (2  9) matrices G1 and G2 satisfy G1 =  (A122) 1A121 and G2 = G   G1. It
also follows that under optimal discretion, the evolution of the predetermined variables is
governed by
Xt+1 = HXt + JXtjt +N"t+1; (A.17)
where (99) matrices H and J satisfy H = A111+A112G1 and J = A112G2+A211+A212G+B1F .
Our fth task is to explain how agents derive Xtjt. First, note that Eq. (A.12) implies that
the innovation in Zt is a linear function of the forecast error Xt  Xtjt 1. We can therefore
express the optimal prediction of Xt in terms of the (steady-state) Kalman lter as follows
Xtjt = Xtjt 1 +K(Zt   Ztjt 1)
= Xtjt 1 +KD(Xt  Xtjt 1); (A.18)
where the (9 3) gain matrix K must be determined.
To nd K it is helpful to reformulate the problem in terms of prediction errors so that
it admits a state-space representation. Dene ~Xt  Xt   Xtjt 1 and ~Zt  Zt   Ztjt 1, and
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rewrite Eqs. (A.12) and (A.17) as
Zt   Ztjt 1 = D(Xt  Xtjt 1)
~Zt = D ~Xt (A.19)
and
Xt+1  Xt+1jt = HXt + JXtjt +N"t+1  HXtjt   JXtjt
= H(Xt  Xtjt) +N"t+1
= H(Xt  Xtjt 1  KD(Xt  Xtjt 1)) +N"t+1
= H(I  KD)(Xt  Xtjt 1) +N"t+1
~Xt+1 = T ~Xt +N"t+1; (A.20)
where we have made use of Eq. (A.18) and dened T = H(I  KD).
Eqs. (A.20) and (A.19) are the state and measurement equations for a standard Kalman-
lter problem with ~Xt as the unobserved variable and ~Zt as the observed variable. It follows
that the prediction equation for ~Xt is given by the standard formula for updating a linear
projection (e.g., Harvey, 1989)
~Xtjt = PD0(DPD0) 1D ~Xt; (A.21)
where we use the fact that ~Xtjt 1 = 0. P  Cov[ ~Xt   ~Xtjt 1] = Cov[ ~Xt] = Cov[Xt  Xtjt 1]
is the (9  9) covariance matrix of the prediction errors for ~Xt, which are the same as the
prediction errors for Xt since ~Xtjt 1 = 0. Rewrite Eq. (A.21) in terms of Xt and Xtjt 1 to
obtain
Xtjt = Xtjt 1 + PD0(DPD0) 1D(Xt  Xtjt 1): (A.22)
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A comparison Eqs. (A.18) and (A.22) shows that the Kalman gain matrix is
K = PD0(DPD0) 1; (A.23)
where it remains to determine P . From Eq. (A.20) we get
Cov[ ~Xt+1]  P = TPT 0 +NN 0 = H(I  KD)P (I  KD)0H 0 +NN 0
= H(P  KDP )(I  D0K 0)H 0 +NN 0
= H[P   PD0K 0  KDP +KDPD0K 0]H 0 +NN 0
= H[P   PD0K 0  KDP + PD0K 0]H 0 +NN 0
= H[P  KDP ]H 0 +NN 0
P = H[P   PD0(DPD0) 1DP ]H 0 +NN 0: (A.24)
Therefore, P is dened as the xed point of Eq. (A.24).
The nal task is to derive the augmented state-space model that we take to the data.
The transition equation for the augmented state is
st+1 =Mst +N"t+1: (A.25)
The (18  1) state vector is st  [X 0t X 0tjt 1]0 and the (6  1) vector of shocks is "t+1 =
["y;t+1 ";t+1 "n;t+1 "u;t+1 "g;t+1 "p;t+1]
0. The (18 18) and (18 6) matrices M and N are
M =
264 H + JKD J(I  KD)
(H + J)KD (H + J)(I  KD)
375 N =
264 N
096
375 :
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The measurement equation is given by
yt = Tst + ut; (A.26)
where yt  [Z 0t it yt t]0 and ut  [0 0 0 ui;t 0 0]0. Let dt  [it yt t]0. Then
dt = SXt + Siit + [ui;t 0 0]
0
= SXt + SiF (Xtjt 1 +KD(Xt  Xtjt 1)) + [ui;t 0 0]0; (A.27)
where the (3 9) and (3 1) matrices S and Si are given by
S =
266664
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0  1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
377775 Si =
266664
1
0
0
377775 :
Stacking Eqs. (A.12) and (A.27) yields Eq. (A.26) with (6 18) matrix T dened as
T =
264 D 039
S + SiFKD SiF (I  KD)
375 :
Appendix B. The Complete Information Model
Under complete information agents perfectly observe all of the predetermined variables com-
prising Xt each period. These include the true values of measured quantities such as output
and ination in addition to the purely theoretical concepts like the natural rates of output and
unemployment. The aggregate behavioral relationships and the central bank's loss function
represented by Eqs. (A.1) - (A.5) are exactly the same as in the partial information model. To
characterize the dynamics of the model under complete information, x the matrix D in Eq.
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(A.12) equal to the identity matrix and recompute the equilibrium laws of motion given by
Eqs. (A.14) - (A.18). First, note that the steady-state gain matrix K = PD0(DPD0) 1 = I
whenever D = I. It immediately follows from Eq. (A.18) that Xtjt = Xt. Replacing the opti-
mal forecast of the predetermined state vector with its actual value in Eqs. (A.14), (A.16),
and (A.17) yields the following recursive equilibrium:
it = FXt (B.1)
xt = GXt (B.2)
Xt+1 = (H + J)Xt +N"t+1; (B.3)
where G = G1 + G2 and H + J = A11 + A12G + B1F . Of course, it is not surprising that
the optimal strategies embodied by F , G, and H + J are the same as the ones implied by
partial information given that the model satises the certainty equivalence principle.
It is straightforward to express the equilibrium under complete information in state-space
form so that the parameters can be estimated using maximum likelihood. Since agents' beliefs
about economic conditions are always correct, there is no need to augment the state vector
with ecient forecasts of the predetermined variables as in Eq. (A.25). It follows that the
transition equation is simply given by Eq. (B.3).
Themeasurement equation links the econometrician's observed variables in period t to the
stateXt. As explained in section 4.1 of the paper, the set of observables relevant for estimation
is given by ~dt  [ut it yt t]0. Under full information the model makes no distinction
between the true values of output growth and ination and the observable concepts that
agents acquire in real time, so the measurement shocks vg;t and vp;t appearing in Eqs. (A.6)
and (A.7) equal zero in every period. As a result, we discard the real-time data on these
variables and estimate the model using only the nal published data described in section 4.
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Specically, the measurement equation takes the form
~dt = ~SXt + ~Siit + [0 ui;t 0 0]
0
= ( ~S + ~SiF )Xt + [0 ui;t 0 0]
0; (B.4)
where
~S =
266666664
  0   0   1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0  1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
377777775
~Si =
266666664
0
1
0
0
377777775
:
The system given by Eqs. (B.3) and (B.4) can then be used to evaluate the log-likelihood
function using standard Kalman ltering techniques.
Appendix C. Forward-Looking Indicators
In the partial information model presented in section 2, all of the indicator variables are
predetermined. The standard Kalman lter can therefore be used to forecast the state as
illustrated in appendix A. When there are forward-looking indicators, however, agents face
a simultaneity problem that makes the standard Kalman lter inapplicable. In this case the
indicators are determined, in part, by expectations of future endogenous variables. Simul-
taneity arises because these expectations depend on an estimate of the current state, and
that estimate in turn depends on observations of the forward-looking indicators. Pearlman
et al. (1986), and more recently Svensson and Woodford (2003), demonstrate how the signal-
extraction problem can be recast as one involving only predetermined indicators. They go
on to show that the updating equations take the form of a modied Kalman lter capable
of handling the kind of simultaneity issue described above.
In this appendix we present estimates from a variant of the benchmark model in which the
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observables are forward-looking rather than predetermined. Specically, the model replaces
Eqs. (A.1) and (A.2) with IS and Phillips curves of the form
yt = yt+1jt + (1  )[yt 1 + (1  )yt 2]  (it   t+1jt) + "y;t; (C.1)
t = t+1jt + (1  )t 1 + (yt   ynt ) + ";t: (C.2)
The only changes appearing in Eqs. (C.1) and (C.2) are the removal of lags in the trans-
mission mechanism and in the dating of conditional expectations. These adjustments to the
timing protocols mean that current and expected future policy actions will now have a con-
temporaneous eect on the indicators given by Zt = [y
o
t 
o
t ut]
0. The rest of the aggregate
relationships in the model as well as the loss function stay the same.
To write the structural model in the form of Eq. (A.11), we redene the vector of prede-
termined variables as Xt = ["y;t ";t y
n
t yt 1 yt 2 t 1 it 1 y
n
t 1 "u;t vg;t vp;t]
0 and the vector of
forward-looking variables as xt = [yt t]
0. The indicators are then linked to the state by
Zt =

D1
 D2
264 Xt
xt
375 ; (C.3)
where D1 and D2 are submatrices conformable to Xt and xt. We use the algorithms provided
by Svensson and Woodford (2003) to compute the equilibrium under optimal discretion. The
solution procedure yields a policy rule expressing the interest rate as a function of Xtjt, laws
of motion for Xt, xt, and Zt, and a forecasting equation for Xtjt describing how agents update
their beliefs about the predetermined state variables. The entire system is then mapped into
state-space form in a manner similar to that described in appendix A, and the parameters
are estimated by maximum likelihood. Like the analysis of section 5.1, we compare estimates
of the model with partial information to those from a version in which agents have complete
information about the state. The results appear in Table 6.
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With a few exceptions, estimates of the model containing forward-looking indicators are
close to those of the benchmark model featuring only backward-looking indicators. Estimates
of the demand shock y, for example, are smaller in the case of forward-looking indicators
under both partial and complete information. The Phillips curve parameters are also some-
what dierent but only under partial information. With forward-looking indicators, the point
estimate of  becomes smaller while that of  becomes larger, although neither is statisti-
cally signicant. Importantly, the presence of forward-looking indicators does not greatly
aect inferences concerning the weight on output gap stability. The estimate of y is 0.32
with a standard error of 0.11 under partial information, but under complete information the
estimate is 0.42 with a standard error of 0.35. Thus only in the case of partial information
is y signicantly dierent from zero. Regarding the weight on interest rate smoothing, the
point estimate of i is still insignicant under complete information but is now large and
signicant under partial information. Finally, log likelihood in the partial information model
with forward-looking indicators is  725:30 compared to  671:25 in the benchmark model
with backward-looking indicators. Although it does not constitute a formal hypothesis test
(since the models are non-nested), the fact that log likelihood is higher in the benchmark
model suggests that it is more congruent with the observed data.
Appendix D. An Estimate of the Gain Matrix
In this appendix we clarify how the indicator variables are used by private agents and the
central bank in revising their forecasts of the state. This information is provided by estimates
of the Kalman gain matrix K. Recall that inferences about the value of Xt are updated on
the basis of new observations on Zt according to Xtjt = Xtjt 1 + K(Zt   Ztjt 1). Thus the
(i,j) element of K is the weight placed on innovations to the jth indicator on forecasts of the
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ith state variable. Given the partial information estimates in Table 1, the gain matrix is
K =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
yot 
o
t ut
ytjt 0:4641
(0:0374)
0:0003
(0:0002)
 0:3191
(0:0947)
tjt 0:0002
(0:0001)
0:5656
(0:0585)
0:0009
(0:0010)
yn
tjt 0:3327(0:0449)
 0:0017
(0:0016)
1:4253
(0:3411)
yt 1jt  0:1549
(0:0279)
0:0002
(0:0002)
0:3146
(0:1021)
it 1 0:0000
(0:0000)
0:0000
(0:0000)
0:0000
(0:0000)
yn
t 1jt  0:2287
(0:0229)
 0:0017
(0:0017)
 0:2531
(0:1310)
"u;tjt 0:0221
(0:0171)
0:0000
(0:0000)
0:1115
(0:0882)
vg;tjt 0:3810
(0:0389)
 0:0000
(0:0000)
0:6337
(0:1043)
vp;tjt  0:0002
(0:0001)
0:4344
(0:0585)
 0:0009
(0:0010)
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
;
where standard errors (in parentheses) are found using the delta method.
Among the ndings revealed by our estimate of K, one that stands out is the asymmetric
eect changes in the unemployment rate have on real-time estimates of the output gap and
ination. A unit innovation to ut evidently causes agents to revise down their forecast of
the output gap (i.e., ytjt   yntjt) by 1.7444 percentage points ( 0:3191   1:4253 =  1:7444)
but revise up their forecast of ination tjt by only 0.0009 percentage points. The reason
why agents rely heavily on ut in forming estimates of the output gap but very little in
estimating ination is because the signal-to-noise ratio implied by the structural model is
considerably higher in the former. This is a result of the strong contemporaneous linkage
between unemployment and the output gap established by Okun's Law. In the partial infor-
mation model the estimated value of the Okun coecient  is 0.3843. The relationship with
ination, however, is far weaker since nominal factors only aect unemployment indirectly
by shifting output via the real interest rate. The estimate of the slope coecient  in the
IS equation is 0.0009. It follows that ination-induced changes in the real interest rate will
have rather small eects on output and hence the unemployment rate.
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Table 1
Parameter Estimates
Model Parameter Partial Complete Partial Complete
Parameter Description Information Information Information Information
y demand shock 0:6831
(0:0539)
0:7302
(0:0608)
0:6718
(0:0601)
0:7299
(0:0624)
 cost-push shock 0:9367
(0:1083)
1:0424
(0:1269)
0:9455
(0:1037)
1:0406
(0:1248)
n natural output shock 0:5149
(0:0702)
0:2805
(0:0381)
0:4952
(0:1471)
0:2827
(0:0574)
u natural unemployment shock 0:0790
(0:0313)
0:1678
(0:0233)
0:0308
(0:1251)
0:1674
(0:0212)
g output growth noise 0:4229
(0:0280)
  0:4428
(0:0435)
 
p ination noise 0:8780
(0:0641)
  0:8808
(0:0664)
 
i interest rate shock 0:8602
(0:0564)
0:6689
(0:0870)
0:8701
(0:0515)
0:6715
(0:0639)
g serial correlation in g  0:1076
(0:0893)
   0:0476
(0:1441)
 
p serial correlation in p 0:0981
(0:0902)
  0:1069
(0:0927)
 
 expected future output 0:3610
(0:0049)
0:3770
(0:0053)
0:3493
(0:0032)
0:3775
(0:0058)
 lagged output 1:4752
(0:0073)
1:4448
(0:0091)
1:4934
(0:0093)
1:4448
(0:0089)
 interest rate elasticity 0:0009
(0:0003)
0:0006
(0:0004)
0:0012
(0:0006)
0:0006
(0:0003)
 expected future ination 0:4727
(0:0240)
0:5298
(0:0168)
0:4464
(0:0662)
0:5329
(0:0061)
 output gap elasticity 0:0032
(0:0029)
0:0015
(0:0056)
0:0110
(0:0132)
8:99e-8
(2:35e-8)
 lagged natural output 0:9107
(0:0116)
0:9273
(0:0155)
0:9138
(0:0097)
0:9269
(0:0192)
y demand shock feedback 0:3224
(0:0798)
0:4649
(0:0711)
0:3578
(0:0933)
0:4646
(0:0705)
 Okun coecient 0:3843
(0:0327)
0:4641
(0:0583)
0:4168
(0:1239)
0:4636
(0:0639)
 loss discount factor 0:99 0:99 0:99 0:99
y output gap weight 0:2687
(0:1196)
0:1478
(0:5042)
0 0;y
i interest-rate smoothing weight 0:7578
(0:5318)
0:1552
(0:5258)
1:8982
(0:7170)
1:03e-5
(2:10e-7)
lnL log likelihood  671:2532  445:1656  675:5590  445:2034
Notes: The table reports maximum-likelihood estimates of Eqs. (1) - (10) under partial and complete information. Numbers in
parentheses are standard errors.  denotes a value that is imposed prior to estimation. yThe restriction in this case is y = 1e-5.
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Table 2
Policy-Rule Coecient Estimates
Partial Information Complete Information
it = yytjt + tjt + nyntjt + yyyt 1jt + iit 1 it = yyt + t + ny
n
t + yyyt 1 + iit 1
Coecient Optimal Unrestricted Optimal Unrestricted
y 0:6784
(0:0555)
0:6641
(0:0721)
0:6385
(0:0892)
2:5171
(1:1078)
 0:2940
(0:0315)
0:2944
(0:0509)
0:2684
(0:0471)
0:2757
(0:0902)
n  0:1311
(0:0320)
 0:3480
(0:2561)
 0:2474
(0:0756)
 5:0534
(3:5627)
yy  0:6629
(0:0526)
 0:6374
(0:0623)
 0:5617
(0:0792)
 2:4589
(1:1505)
i 0:8575
(0:0167)
0:8561
(0:0219)
0:8770
(0:0239)
0:8988
(0:1672)
Notes: The table reports maximum-likelihood estimates of policy-rule coecients under partial and complete information. In
each case the rst set of estimates are the optimal coecients implied by discretionary policy and the second are the unrestricted
estimates obtained by treating the policy equation as free. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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Table 3
Parameter Estimates under Optimal and Unrestricted Policy
Model Parameter Partial Information Complete Information
Parameter Description Optimal Unrestricted Optimal Unrestricted
y demand shock 0:6831
(0:0539)
0:6521
(0:0564)
0:7302
(0:0608)
0:6806
(0:0544)
 cost-push shock 0:9367
(0:1083)
0:9399
(0:1103)
1:0424
(0:1269)
1:0425
(0:1235)
n natural output shock 0:5149
(0:0702)
0:3327
(0:1914)
0:2805
(0:0381)
0:1270
(0:0378)
u natural unemployment shock 0:0790
(0:0313)
0:1446
(0:0639)
0:1678
(0:0233)
0:1832
(0:0122)
g output growth noise 0:4229
(0:0280)
0:4387
(0:0300)
   
p ination noise 0:8780
(0:0641)
0:8793
(0:0659)
   
i interest rate shock 0:8602
(0:0564)
0:8573
(0:0641)
0:6689
(0:0870)
0:1803
(0:6388)
g serial correlation in g  0:1076
(0:0893)
 0:0656
(0:0918)
   
p serial correlation in p 0:0981
(0:0902)
0:1007
(0:0890)
   
 expected future output 0:3610
(0:0049)
0:3448
(0:0045)
0:3770
(0:0053)
0:4430
(0:0245)
 lagged output 1:4752
(0:0073)
1:5089
(0:0110)
1:4448
(0:0091)
1:2397
(0:0827)
 interest rate elasticity 0:0009
(0:0003)
0:0007
(0:0005)
0:0006
(0:0004)
0:0013
(0:0029)
 expected future ination 0:4727
(0:0240)
0:4630
(0:0301)
0:5298
(0:0168)
0:5383
(0:0219)
 output gap elasticity 0:0032
(0:0029)
0:0033
(0:0036)
0:0015
(0:0056)
1:61e-9
(0:0005)
 lagged natural output 0:9107
(0:0116)
0:9278
(0:0233)
0:9273
(0:0155)
0:2774
(0:2032)
y demand shock feedback 0:3224
(0:0798)
0:4175
(0:0875)
0:4649
(0:0711)
0:4015
(0:0780)
 Okun coecient 0:3843
(0:0327)
0:4302
(0:0506)
0:4641
(0:0583)
0:4280
(0:0339)
 loss discount factor 0:99   0:99  
y output gap weight 0:2687
(0:1196)
  0:1478
(0:5042)
 
i interest-rate smoothing weight 0:7578
(0:5318)
  0:1552
(0:5258)
 
lnL log likelihood  671:2532  665:5937  445:1656  406:8995
BIC Bayesian information criterion  716:9690  718:5277  481:2570  450:2092
M pseudo-posterior odds 0:8262 0:1738 0:0000 1:0000
Notes: The table reports maximum-likelihood estimates of Eqs. (1) - (10) under partial and complete information. In each case
the rst set of estimates is obtained under discretion and the second set is obtained under the unrestricted policy. Numbers in
parentheses are standard errors.  denotes a value that is imposed prior to estimation.
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Table 4
Summary Statistics: 1979:Q3 - 2010:Q1
Variable Mean SD Min Max AR
q^t -1.06 4.49 -13.64 5.50 0.98
q^tjt -1.84 4.19 -13.68 3.99 0.99
q^tjt   q^t -0.78 0.42 -1.59 0.45 0.93
^t 0.00 2.03 -4.25 8.09 0.84
^tjt 0.01 1.89 -2.27 6.62 0.92
^tjt   ^t 0.01 0.72 -2.07 2.52 0.28
Notes: The sample consists of 123 quarterly estimates obtained from the Kalman smoother. q^t and q^tjt are estimates of the
actual and perceived values of the output gap (i.e., yt ynt ), while ^t and ^tjt are estimates of the actual and perceived values of
ination. The statistics shown for each variable are: Mean, the mean; SD, the standard deviation; Min and Max, the minimum
and maximum values; and AR, the rst-order autocorrelation coecient.
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Table 5
Variance Decompositions
qtjt   qt tjt   t
Forecast Horizon 1-Year 3-Year 10-Year 1-Year 3-Year 10-Year
demand shock 4:8445
(2:2782)
2:2682
(0:9873)
2:1647
(1:1688)
0:0000
(0:0000)
0:0000
(0:0000)
0:0000
(0:0000)
cost-push shock 0:0082
(0:0167)
0:0090
(0:0184)
0:0091
(0:0185)
40:1764
(5:3094)
40:1763
(5:3093)
40:1762
(5:3092)
natural output shock 54:1239
(6:0727)
59:3571
(5:6982)
62:0603
(4:7606)
0:0000
(0:0001)
0:0002
(0:0004)
0:0004
(0:0008)
natural unemployment shock 35:7956
(6:4756)
35:5043
(6:5361)
34:1008
(6:4918)
0:0000
(0:0000)
0:0001
(0:0002)
0:0002
(0:0004)
output growth noise 5:2242
(1:9397)
2:8581
(1:2108)
1:6625
(1:0021)
0:0000
(0:0000)
0:0000
(0:0000)
0:0000
(0:0000)
ination noise 0:0036
(0:0073)
0:0029
(0:0059)
0:0026
(0:0053)
59:8235
(5:3095)
59:8234
(5:3096)
59:8232
(5:3098)
Notes: The table reports the percentage of the variances of output gap misperceptions (qtjt   qt) and ination misperceptions
(tjt   t) attributed to each shock. Error variances are computed at a 1-year, 3-year, and 10-year forecast horizon for both
variables. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors obtained using the delta method.
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Table 6
Forward-Looking Indicators
Model Parameter Forward-Looking Indicators Predetermined Indicators
Parameter Description Partial Complete Partial Complete
y demand shock 0:4632
(0:0309)
0:2730
(0:0225)
0:6831
(0:0539)
0:7302
(0:0608)
 cost-push shock 0:8728
(0:2862)
0:5642
(0:0730)
0:9367
(0:1083)
1:0424
(0:1269)
n natural output shock 0:5491
(0:0672)
0:2918
(0:0448)
0:5149
(0:0702)
0:2805
(0:0381)
u natural unemployment shock 0:0746
(0:0288)
0:1670
(0:0245)
0:0790
(0:0313)
0:1678
(0:0233)
g output growth noise 0:4752
(0:0315)
  0:4229
(0:0280)
 
p ination noise 0:8809
(0:0921)
  0:8780
(0:0641)
 
i interest rate shock 0:8721
(0:0596)
0:6763
(0:0873)
0:8602
(0:0564)
0:6689
(0:0870)
g serial correlation in g 0:0094
(0:0940)
   0:1076
(0:0893)
 
p serial correlation in p 0:1200
(0:1118)
  0:0981
(0:0902)
 
 expected future output 0:3593
(0:0037)
0:3724
(0:0052)
0:3610
(0:0049)
0:3770
(0:0053)
 lagged output 1:4878
(0:0061)
1:4536
(0:0114)
1:4752
(0:0073)
1:4448
(0:0091)
 interest rate elasticity 0:0012
(0:0004)
0:0006
(0:0004)
0:0009
(0:0003)
0:0006
(0:0004)
 expected future ination 0:2320
(0:3482)
0:5217
(0:0162)
0:4727
(0:0240)
0:5298
(0:0168)
 output gap elasticity 0:0237
(0:0231)
0:0057
(0:0040)
0:0032
(0:0029)
0:0015
(0:0056)
 lagged natural output 0:9046
(0:0128)
0:9296
(0:0152)
0:9107
(0:0116)
0:9273
(0:0155)
y demand shock feedback 0:4307
(0:0901)
1:2176
(0:1986)
0:3224
(0:0798)
0:4649
(0:0711)
 Okun coecient 0:3582
(0:0237)
0:4578
(0:0577)
0:3843
(0:0327)
0:4641
(0:0583)
 loss discount factor 0:99 0:99 0:99 0:99
y output gap weight 0:3232
(0:1103)
0:4242
(0:3510)
0:2687
(0:1196)
0:1478
(0:5042)
i interest-rate smoothing weight 1:6568
(0:5735)
0:7382
(0:4440)
0:7578
(0:5318)
0:1552
(0:5258)
lnL log likelihood  725:2954  447:8649  671:2532  445:1656
Notes: The table reports maximum-likelihood estimates of Eqs. (C.1), (C.2), and (3) - (10) as well as estimates of Eqs. (1) -
(10). In both cases the partial and complete information estimates are reported. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
 denotes a value that is imposed prior to estimation.
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Fig. 1. Panels (a) and (b) plot the ex post revised series for per capita real GDP growth, yt, and GDP ination, t. Panels
(c) and (d) plot the series of historical revisions to real-time per capita GDP growth, yot  yt, and GDP ination, ot   t.
Panels (e) and (f) plot changes in the civilian unemployment rate, ut, and the annual yield on 3-month US Treasury bills, it.
56
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
−15
−10
−5
0
5
pe
rc
en
t
(a): Actual and Perceived Output Gap
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
−2
−1
0
1
2
pe
rc
en
t
(b): Real−Time Perception Errors
Fig. 2. Panel (a) plots the estimates of the actual output gap (qt  yt   ynt , solid line) and the perceived output gap
(qtjt  ytjt yntjt, dotted line) obtained from the Kalman smoother. Panel (b) plots estimates of the implied real-time perception
errors, qtjt   qt. The shaded regions correspond to NBER recessions.
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(b): Real−Time Perception Errors
Fig. 3. Panel (a) plots the estimates of actual ination (t, solid line) and perceived ination (tjt, dotted line) obtained
from the Kalman smoother. Panel (b) plots estimates of the implied real-time perception errors, tjt   t. The shaded regions
correspond to NBER recessions.
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